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Standard of Review Under the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection Component: Adarand Expands
the Application of Strict Scrutiny
[I]n view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this coun-
try no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law.1
INTRODUCTION
During its October 1994 Term, the United States Supreme
Court re-examined the standard of review used to determine the
validity of racial classifications. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,2 the Court held that all racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny whether they are imposed by a federal, state, or
local governmental body.3 The Court's holding in Adarand is not
only logically based on previous Supreme Court holdings but will
provide a uniform test for federal courts to apply in future cases.
However, before applauding the Adarand decision for its attempt
to create a uniform standard of review for racial classifications, it
is important to understand not only what happened in Adarand,
but also what the Supreme Court means when it refers to such
conclusory terms as "strict scrutiny review."
Section I of this comment discusses the Adarand decision in
light of the Court's history of viewing the Constitution as being
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
3. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opin-
ion and was joined by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2101. The other three Justices in the
majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia. Id. Justice
Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2118. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 2119. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Id. at 2131. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Breyer joined. Id. at 2134.
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"color-blind." This theme allows the Court to quickly and method-
ically dismiss affirmative action programs without offering solu-
tions to society's racial problems. Section II examines the stan-
dards of review that the Court has developed to examine classifi-
cations based on race. Section III returns to the heart of the
opinion given in Adarand and explains why the Court's holding
is based on questionable inferences and questionable legal rea-
soning. In Section IV, this comment concludes that the Court has
come "full circle," applying strict scrutiny to all equal protection
challenges based on racial classifications.
SECTION I: THE ADARAND HOLDING
In 1989, Mountain Gravel and Construction Company ("Moun-
tain Gravel") was awarded a contract for a highway construction
project from the Central Federal Lands Highway Division (the
"CFLHD").4 Adarand Constructors, Inc. ("Adarand") submitted
the low bid for a subcontract to erect guardrails along a stretch of
highway located on federally-owned land in Colorado.5 Mountain
Gravel awarded the subcontract to a Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise ("DBE") that had submitted a higher bid.' The con-
tract in Adarand was formed as a result of the Surface Trans-
portation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (the
"STURAA"). 7 The STURAA reserves at least ten percent of fund-
ing for DBE's as defined by the Small Business Act.8 As a recipi-
ent of federal highway funds, the CFLHD used a Subcontracting
Compensation Clause ("SCC") program.9 Under federal regula-
tions promulgated in response to STURAA, a DBE is defined as a
small business that is at least fifty-one percent owned and man-
4. Id. at 2102. The CFLHD is a unit of the United States Department of
Transportation. Id.
5. Id.
6. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D. Colo.
1992), aftd sub nom. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir.
1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
7. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 132, 145.
8. Id. The Small Business Act provides in relevant part: "It is the policy of
the United States that small business concerns, and small business concerns owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, shall have the
maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let
by any federal agency." 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The federal regulations
include a waiver provision that provides that participating agencies could award less
than ten percent of their funding to DBE's by seeking the approval of the Secretary
of Transportation. 49 C.F.R. §§ 23.64(e), 23.65 and pt. 23, app. D to subpart D
(1994).
9. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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aged by disadvantaged individuals."
Adarand filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, claiming that the use of raced-based subcon-
tracting clauses violates the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment." The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the Government and Adarand appealed.'" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying
an intermediate scrutiny review, affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court and held that the subcontracting program was narrow-
ly designed to achieve its important purpose of benefiting small
disadvantaged businesses.'3
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari 4 and vacated
and remanded the case in light of its holding that all racial clas-
sifications imposed by either a local, state, or federal entity must
serve "compelling governmental interests" and be "narrowly tai-
lored" to achieve those interests." Essentially, the Court
changed the standard of review for federal racial classifications
from intermediate scrutiny to strict scrutiny. However, the Court
left unsettled the issue of what will satisfy a strict scrutiny re-
10. 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 (1994). The category of disadvantaged individuals is
rebuttably presumed to include "women, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Na-
tive Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, [and] Asian-Indian Americans." Id.
11. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104. The Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides in relevant part that: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part that:
"[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has interpreted the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to include an "equal protection component" that
applies to the federal government; similar to that contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (concluding that just as
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated schools, the Fifth Amendment imposes a similar
equal protection duty on the federal government).
12. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2104. In granting the Government's motion for
summary judgment, the district court concluded that the subcontractor program: 1)
serve "important governmental objectives;" and 2) is "substantially related" to the
achievement of those objectives. Adarand, 790 F. Supp. at 244. The test used by the
district court has come to be known as "intermediate scrutiny review." See Adarand,
115 S. Ct. at 2112.
13. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.
14. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1995) (granting certiora-
ri).
15. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. However, the Court in Adarand remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with the majority's opinion to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 2118. The Court concluded that "[tihe question of
whether any of the ways in which the Government uses subcontractor compensation
clauses can survive strict scrutiny . . . should be addressed in the first instance by
the lower courts." Id.
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view. While the Supreme Court's use of strict scrutiny appears to
be a logical step toward uniformity, federal courts may be even
more divided in applying the standard than the Supreme Court,
which chose the standard.1" Thus, while creating a uniform
standard of review in Adarand for all race-based classifications,
the Supreme Court may have formulated an inception of confu-
sion among federal courts attempting to apply a simple two-part
test that is harmless on the surface, but rather complex when
actually applied to a set of facts.
SECTION II: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR RACE-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Any discussion of constitutional law begins with the United
States Constitution itself. The Constitution makes no specific
reference to either race or slavery, but contains three provisions
premised on the continued recognition of slavery."7 The first pro-
vision provides that "other persons," which meant African-Ameri-
cans, would be counted as "three-fifths" of a person for the pur-
pose of apportioning representatives among the states.8 The
second provision provides that Congress could not prohibit the
"Importation of... persons" until 1808."M The third provision
provides that "persons held in Service or Labour in one State"
16. As one commentator has noted: "For the last five years, no one has dis-
cerned with any great sense of comfort what it means for a set-aside program to be
'narrowly tailored' to achieve a 'compelling governmental interest.'" Nicole Duncan,
Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 679, 680 (1995). In addition, Duncan concluded that in
applying strict scrutiny, "[t]he circuit courts have demonstrated a tendency toward
feeling their way around the matter, like the blind lady of justice herself." Id. at
680-81.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9;
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1865).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868). Section 2 provides in rele-
vant part that: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States .. .according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of all other Per-
sons." Id.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Section 9 provides that: "The Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight. ... " Id.
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who had fled to another state in the Union must be returned.0
These provisions clearly indicate that the Framers of the Consti-
tution recognized the institution of slavery as valid at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution.
Before addressing the traditional case law involving standards
of review and racial classifications, it is important to examine the
Court's early rulings involving race by reviewing three cases:
Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 ' Plessy v. Ferguson,2 and Brown v.
Board of Education.3 In Dred Scott, the Court held that Dred
Scott, an African-American, lacked standing to sue in federal
court because he was not a citizen under the Constitution.24
Dred Scott quickly became the most criticized decision by the
Supreme Court. However, the adoption and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 created the famous principles of
"equal protection" soon thereafter, and the long, hard road to
equality began.
The first landmark case after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Plessy v. Ferguson, continued the Court's lack of
recognition of equal protection rights of African-Americans. In
Plessy, the Court held that a Louisiana statute that required
Caucasians and African-Americans to be furnished with separate
accommodations on railway trains did not violate the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.2 The Court
reasoned that the statute did not confer inferior status based on
race, and noted that the statute was neutral in its effect on
race.2" Plessy soon became known for the proposition of "sepa-
rate but equal" treatment for African-Americans.27 More impor-
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1865). Section 2 provides that:
No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
Id.
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454. The Court concluded "that neither
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, wheth-
er they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people nor
intended to be included in the general words used in [the Declaration of Indepen-
dence]." Id. at 407.
25. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-48. The Thirteenth Amendment provides in part
that: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
26. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
27. See Neil A. Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44
1996 329
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tantly, Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, established the
principle that the Constitution is "color-blind."28 It is ironic that
Justice Harlan's dissent would provide the backdrop in the late
twentieth century for non-minorities attempting to strike down
racial classifications that favor minorities.
From the beginning, "legal equality," or equality of all persons,
has been the principal objective of opponents of racial segrega-
tion. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court reversed Plessy's
"separate but equal" doctrine as it applied to public education
and held that segregation of children in public schools solely on
the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 More importantly, the central holding
in Brown was that the "Fourteenth Amendment ... proscrib[es]
all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race."30
Thus, the chronology of Dred Scott to Brown provides an impor-
tant and broad roadmap for understanding the Court's develop-
ment of standards of review for racial classifications that were
challenged by the principles of equal protection as included in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The first major Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to
a federal racial classification came during World War I in
Korematsu v. United States.3' Korematsu, an American citizen of
STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1991).
28. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. The Court asked the following: "Does segregation
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the mi-
nority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does .... Sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 493, 495.
30. Id. at 490. Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist was Justice Jackson's law
clerk at the time Brown was decided. Although the context is unclear and it was
written over forty years ago, the following memorandum given to Justice Jackson by
his law clerk at the time, William Rehnquist, should be noted:
I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I
have been excoriated by "liberal" colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson
was right and should be re-affirmed. If the Fourteenth Amendment did not
enact Spencer's Social Statics, it just as surely did not enact Myrdahl's [sic]
American Dilemma.
Memorandum of William H. Rehnquist to Supreme Court Justice Jackson (1952),
reprinted in 117 Cong. Rec. 45,440-41 (1971).
31 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Many legal scholars invoke footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), as the Supreme Court's first
recognition of varying degrees of scrutiny that the judicial branch should use as its
standard of review. See Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and
Affirmative Action, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 923, 933 (1995). For example, Winkler
states that "[flootnote four of Carolene Products created the framework for the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence in the modern age by establishing varying
levels of judicial scrutiny to specific types of legislative classifications." Id. Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone stated in footnote four of Carolene Products that "whether preju-
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Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal court for being in an
excluded area contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the
United States Army (the "Order")." The Order directed all per-
sons of Japanese descent to be excluded from military areas.3
The Court asserted that any legal restrictions which take away
the civil rights of a single racial group are to be viewed as imme-
diately suspect.34 The issue in Korematsu was whether the Or-
der was within the power of Congress and the Executive
Branch. 5 The Court held that the race-based order was within
the powers of Congress and the Executive Branch." The Court
reasoned that the Order, which excluded those of Japanese de-
scent from an entire area, had a "definite and close relationship"
with the preclusion of sabotage.37
What is interesting about the Korematsu decision is the stan-
dard of review used by the Court. The Court concluded that re-
view of the Order must be examined under the "most rigid scruti-
ny."3 8 At the same time, the Court expanded this standard of
review by concluding that race-based classifications may be justi-
fied if a "[p]ressing public necessity" is found. 9 Thus, the Court
was not afraid to expand or add to the elements of strict scrutiny
by including the possibility of a "[piressing public necessity."'
The Supreme Court next addressed race-based classifications
implemented by the federal government in Bolling v. Sharpe."
The issue in Bolling was whether the federal government's segre-
gation of public schools in the District of Columbia violated the
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
32. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-16.
33. Id. Korematsu's loyalty to the United States was never an issue before the
district court. Id. at 216. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's conviction of Korematsu. Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289
(9th Cir. 1943), af'd, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. The Court further added that legal restric-
tions based on race must be subjected "to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. In addition,
the Court concluded that a "[p]ressing public necessity" can sometimes allow the use
of race-based restrictions. Id.
35. Id. at 217.
36. Id. at 217-18.
37. Id. at 218. Also, the Court reasoned that because it would be impossible
to separate loyal Japanese-Americans from disloyal Japanese-Americans, the
military's exclusion order should be upheld. Id.
38. Id. at 216.
39. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
40. Id.
41. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling was a companion case to Brown.
1996
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Fifth Amendment.42 In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the
Court held that racial segregation in public schools by the gov-
ernment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment because it was not reasonably related to any proper govern-
mental objective.' Chief Justice Warren reasoned that the con-
cepts of "due process" and "equal protection" are not mutually
exclusive and that the discrimination in Boling was unreason-
able and a denial of due process of law.4' The Court concluded
that it would be "unthinkable" that the Constitution would im-
pose a lessor duty on the federal government than that imposed
on states in examining school segregation."'
The Court failed to employ strict scrutiny in Bolling by review-
ing the race-based segregation under a standard that asked
whether the segregation was reasonably related to any proper
governmental objectives. The Court's standard of review was a
combination of both "rational basis review" and intermediate
scrutiny review.46 Nonetheless, the Court's acknowledgment in
Bolling of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component
presaged the Court's reasoning in Adarand.
The next major Supreme Court opinion addressing racial clas-
sifications came in Loving v. Virginia.7 The issue before the
Court was whether a Virginia statute which prevented interracial
marriages violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court held that the racial-
42. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498.
43. Id. at 500.
44. Id. at 499. Thus, the Court inferred that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment contained the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection principles:
an "equal protection component." See id.
45. Id. at 500.
46. "Classifications not drawn on a 'suspect basis' are subject to 'low level' or
'rational basis' review and are usually upheld." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTI-
TU'TIONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1991). Under "rational basis review," the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is satisfied if the classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Under intermediate scru-
tiny review, classifications must serve "important governmental objectives" and must
be "substantially related" to achievement of those objectives to satisfy an equal pro-
tection challenge. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (concluding that
classifications based on gender must satisfy an intermediate scrutiny review). Under
strict scrutiny review, classifications must serve "compelling governmental interests"
and be "narrowly tailored" to the achievement of those interests. See Adarand, 115
S. Ct. at 2113.
47. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
48. Id. at 2. The Virginia Code provided in relevant part that "[i]f any white
person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a
white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished . . . for not less
than one nor more than five years." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1960) (repealed 1968).
Virginia was one of sixteen states which had a statute that prohibited marriages on
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ly discriminatory statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses."9 The majority opin-
ion reasoned that the right to marry is a fundamental right of all
persons."0 More importantly, the Court concluded that the Equal
Protection Clause requires that racial classifications be examined
under "the most rigid scrutiny."5
The next major racial classification case the Court examined
occurred in 1978 in Board of Regents of University of California
v. Bakke. 2 The University of California at Davis created a spe-
cial admissions program for its medical school in which sixteen of
one hundred seats for each class were reserved for minority stu-
dents.53 Bakke, a Caucasian male, was denied admission by the
medical school in both 1973 and 1974, even though his grade
point average and admission test scores were much higher than
those of minorities admitted under the medical school's special
admissions program.54 The issue before the Court was whether
the race-based special admissions program violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Although
Bakke did not produce a majority opinion by the Court, Justice
Powell's opinion announced the judgment of the Court.56 The
Court held that the medical school's minority admissions pro-
gram violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.57
Justice Powell reasoned that race-based classifications are
subject to "stringent examination," and that any legal restriction
the basis of racial classifications. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (citations omitted).
49. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
In addition, the Court reasoned that if racial classifications "are ever to be upheld,
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of
the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Id. In finding that the Virginia statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's standard of review in Loving was
stated as being the "most rigid scrutiny" and was defined as requiring a showing
that the racial classification was "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissi-
ble state objective." Id. This definition of strict scrutiny would appear to be much
easier for a governmental actor to satisfy than the Supreme Court's current defini-
tion of strict scrutiny. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (holding that strict scrutiny
requires a governmental actor to prove that a racial classification serves a "compel-
ling governmental interest" and is "narrowly tailored" toward achieving that inter-
est).
52. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
54. Id. at 276-77.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Id. at 269.
57. Id. at 320.
1996
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which curtails the rights of one race is subject to the "most rigid
scrutiny."58 Also, Justice Powell reasoned that all racial and eth-
nic classifications of any type are "inherently suspect" and re-
quire "the most exacting judicial examination."59 Justice Powell
found that the medical school failed to establish that the race-
based admissions program was adopted to respond to identified
discrimination." Because the medical school had failed to iden-
tify any past specific discrimination, Justice Powell concluded
that the school failed to carry its burden of proving a "compelling
governmental interest" to satisfy strict scrutiny review."' None-
theless, the Court concluded that race could be one of a number
of factors considered by a school in its admissions process." Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, concluded that racial classifications
created for remedial purposes should be reviewed under interme-
diate scrutiny review.3
The Court next faced an equal protection challenge to a federal
classification in Fullilove v. Klutznick." As in Bakke, there was
no majority opinion of the Court.65 The issue in Fullilove was
58. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 309. Specifically, Justice Powell reasoned that: "We have never ap-
proved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victim-
ized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at
307. In addition, Justice Powell added that, "[aifter such findings have been made,
the governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at the ex-
pense of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicat-
ed." Id.
61. Id. at 309-10. More specifically, Justice Powell concluded that "the purpose
of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as
victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes disad-
vantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever
harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suf-
fered." Id. at 310.
62. Id. at 316-17. Justice Powell reasoned that a student's race or ethnic back-
ground may be deemed a "plus" in the student's admissions file which would allow
all students to compete for all one hundred seats without any student being ineligi-
ble for any of the one hundred seats because of the student's race. See id. at 317-
18.
63. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). The four Justices stated that "racial classi-
fications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Id.
(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
64. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
65. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion in which Justices White and Powell joined. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453.
Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
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whether a federal program that included a ten percent "set-aside"
of federal local public works projects funds for minority owned
businesses violated the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 The Court held that
the Minority Business Enterprise ("MBE") provision was valid
under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component.67
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that any classification based upon
race or ethnic background must receive a "most searching exami-
nation" of its constitutionality. 8 The Chief Justice concluded
that Congress did not have to act in a "wholly 'color-blind"' way,
and that the MBE provision would survive appellate review un-
der both tests used in Bakke.6"
Six years later, the Court again examined a racial classifica-
tion system in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.0 The is-
sue before the Court was whether the Jackson Board of Educa-
tion (the "Board") could extend preferential treatment to some
employees because of their national origin or race when making
decisions regarding layoffs.7 Justice Powell first reasoned that
strict scrutiny review was proper because the classification was
based on race.72 In concluding that the layoff plan, which was
designed to benefit minorities, was not "narrowly tailored," the
Court held that the layoff plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7" Also, Justice Powell
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion in which Justices
Blackmun and Brennan joined. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring). Also, Justice
Stewart dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 522
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented and filed an opinion. Id. at
532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472.
67. Id. at 492. The Minority Business Enterprise provision provided in rele-
vant part that: "[N]o grant shall be made . . . for any local public works project
unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, materials, and supplies which will be
used in such project are procured from minority business enterprises." Id. at 458
n.21.
68. Id. at 492.
69. Id. The two standards of review articulated in Bakke are strict scrutiny
and intermediate scrutiny. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291, 359. One wonders what the
real difference is between a "compelling governmental interest" and an "important
governmental objective."
70. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
71. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
72. Id. at 273-74. Justice Powell used the familiar strict scrutiny test that
required both "a compelling governmental interest" and that the compelling interest
be "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal." Id. at 274. Reframing the
issue, Justice Powell stated that: "We must decide whether the layoff provision is
supported by a compelling state purpose and whether the means chosen to accom-
plish that purpose are narrowly tailored." Id.
73. Id. at 283-84. In searching for a compelling governmental interest, the
Court stated that: "This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is
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reasoned that because layoffs caused the whole burden of achiev-
ing equality among races to be borne by particular individuals,
the Board's plan was too intrusive and failed to meet the "nar-
rowly tailored" aspect of strict scrutiny review.74 In addition, the
plurality reasoned that the standard of review did not change
simply because the race-based classification burdened a classifi-
cation of people who historically had not been victims of discrimi-
nation.75
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens overshadows the
Court's holding in Wygant. For example, Justice Stevens rea-
soned that, 'Ti]n the context of public education, it is quite obvi-
ous that a school board may reasonably conclude that an inte-
grated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white,
faculty."76 Justice Stevens was correct when he then asserted
that the question of utmost importance is whether "that public
purpose transcends the harm to the white teachers who are dis-
advantaged by the special preference the Board has given to its
most recently hired minority teachers."" If the issue in Adarand
would have been formulated in this way, perhaps the "color-
blind" majority would have found that the advancement of diver-
sity in our multi-cultural society transcends the harm to Cauca-
sian-owned subcontractors who are disadvantaged by the special
preference given to DBE's.
Three years after the Wygant opinion, the Supreme Court was
confronted with a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection chal-
lenge to a City of Richmond plan which required prime contrac-
tors to subcontract at least thirty percent of awarded contracts to
MBE's in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co." A majority of
sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather the Court has insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing
limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." Id. at
274. However, the Court did not complete its search for a "compelling governmental
interest" because "the layoff provision was not a legally appropriate means of achiev-
ing a compelling purpose." Id. at 278. The Court found that "the means chosen to
achieve the Board's asserted purposes is that of laying off nonminority teachers with
greater seniority in order to retain minority teachers with less seniority." Id. at 282.
74. Id. at 283-84.
75. Id. at 273.
76. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 317. Justice Stevens concluded that "there are two important inqui-
ries in assessing the harm to the disadvantaged teacher. The first is an assessment
of the procedures that were used to adopt, and implement, the race-conscious action.
The second is an evaluation of the nature of the harm itself." Id.
78. 488 U.S. 469, 476-78 (1989). Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of
the Court and delivered the relevant part of the opinion of the Court that addressed
the standard of review to be used by the Court when reviewing classifications based
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the Court first concluded that strict scrutiny is the single stan-
dard of review for racial classifications, and that the standard of
review for a court examining an equal protection challenge did
not change because of the race of those either benefitted or bur-
dened by the racial classification.7 9 The plurality held that the
City failed to satisfy the components of strict scrutiny and that
the City's MBE program violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Justice O'Connor first reasoned
that the City failed to demonstrate a "compelling governmental
interest" to justify the MBE program because the City failed to
establish the type and nature of past discrimination in the City's
construction industry that would permit the thirty percent "set-
aside" for MBE's.' Justice O'Connor then concluded that the
program was not "narrowly tailored" to any goal based on the
Court's findings that no consideration for the use of race-neutral
means to increase minority business involvement in city contract-
ing was given, and the fact that the plan was a thirty percent
outright quota. 2
upon race. Croson, 488 U.S. at 476. There were five separate opinions filed. Id. at
475. One legal scholar, in discussing the relevance of the five separate opinions filed
by the Court, concluded that this many opinions was "an indication of the intense
disagreement on the Court about the basis and validity of affirmative action pro-
grams, and how these programs should be judged." Duncan, supra note 16, at 682.
79. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, White and Kennedy and Justice Scalia, who in concurring in the
judgment of the Court stated that: "I agree . . . with Justice O'Connor's conclusion
that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race." Id. at
520 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[c]lassifications based on
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility." Id. at 493. In addition, Justice O'Connor asserted that "[tihe
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color." Id. at 494 (quoting
Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978)).
80. Id. at 511.
81. Id. at 498-500. Justice O'Connor stated that "[tihere is nothing approach-
ing a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the
Richmond construction industry." Id. at 500. However, one could argue that there
was indeed a prima facie case of constitutional violation based on the following
statement: "While the general population of Richmond was 50% black, only 0.67% of
the city's prime construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in
the 5-year period from 1978 to 1983." Id. at 479-80.
82. Id. at 508. However, Justice O'Connor did provide some guidance as to
when a program can satisfy the demands of heightened scrutiny:
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to
rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction. If the city
of Richmond had evidence before it that nonminority contractors were system-
atically excluding minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities it
could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. Where there is a signifi-
cant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors
willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such con-
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Just one year after the Croson case, the Court once again ex-
amined the subject of racial classifications in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC.3 The issue in Metro Broadcasting was the standard
of review to be used by a court in reviewing "benign" racial clas-
sifications mandated by the federal government. 4 The Court
held that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress-even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of
being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or
societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the
extent that they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives."" Just five years later, a change in the
composition of the Court led to the overruling of Metro Broad-
casting.6
Through the Court's holding in Metro Broadcasting it is evi-
dent that the Court was divided over the proper standard of
review for federal, state and local racial classifications. For exam-
ple, both intermediate and strict scrutiny were asserted in Bakke
for state-based racial classifications. Next, a plurality in Fullilove
adopted strict scrutiny review for a federal governmental man-
date based on racial classifications, and pluralities in Wygant and
Croson concluded that strict scrutiny applied, respectively, to a
state racial classification and a city or local racial classification.
Finally, the Court settled on intermediate scrutiny review in
Metro Broadcasting when considering "benign" federally mandat-
ed race classifications. With so much indecisiveness it is not
surprising that the Court granted Adarand's petition for certiora-
ri. From the Court's decision in Korematsu until its decision in
Metro Broadcasting in 1990, Justice Harlan's theme that the
United States Constitution is "color-blind" is prevalent in the
tractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an
inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise.
Id. at 509.
83. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995). A five to four decision, Metro Broadcasting was the last majority
opinion that Justice Brennan authored.
84. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552. The relevant race classifications were
adopted by the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC"). Id. at 547. The
first preference policy used by the FCC was to award an enhancement for minority
ownership and management when selecting applications for licenses for new televi-
sion or radio stations. Id. The second preference policy adopted by the FCC was to
allow a radio or television broadcaster whose license qualifications had become inad-
equate to transfer the license before the FCC holds a hearing, but only if the trans-
feree is a qualified minority enterprise. Id.
85. Id. at 564-65. Thus, the majority adopted an "intermediate scrutiny" re-
view for benign race-conscious programs mandated by the federal government.
86. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (overruling Metro Broadcasting).
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Court's rationale of using strict scrutiny review for racial classifi-
cations. However, as Justice O'Connor contended in Adarand, the
Court in Metro Broadcasting departed from several prior cases
that examined racial classifications under strict scrutiny."7
Nonetheless, before embarking on an analysis and conclusion
regarding Adarand, two other cases that examined the issue of
racial gerrymandering in the early to mid-1990's are worthy of
mention as examples of the Court's re-affirmation of "color-blind"
constitutional jurisprudence after Metro Broadcasting.
In 1993, in Shaw v. Reno,"5 the North Carolina General As-
sembly (the "Assembly") drew a reapportionment plan that con-
sisted of one majority-minority district after the State of North
Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the United States
House of Representatives."9 After the plan was rejected by the
Attorney General of the United States, the Assembly passed a
new plan consisting of a second majority-minority voting dis-
trict."0 The appellants in Shaw, a group of North Carolina resi-
dents, alleged that the reapportionment plan constituted an un-
constitutional racial gerrymander because the boundary lines of
the districts were of "dramatically irregular shape."1 The issue
was whether the appellants stated a claim under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that the
Assembly adopted a reapportionment plan that was so irrational
87. Id. at 2116. In rejecting the use of intermediate scrutiny for federal racial
classifications, Justice O'Connor concluded that "as we have explained, we do not
face a precedent . . . because Metro Broadcasting itself departed from our prior
cases-and it did so quite recently. By refusing to follow Metro Broadcasting then,
we do not depart from the fabric of the law; we restore it." Id.
88. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
89. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy
joined. Id.
90. Id. at 2819-20. The plan was submitted to the Attorney General because it
affected forty counties in North Carolina that were subject to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Id. at 2820. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§ 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(1988)), provides in relevant part that if a jurisdiction is to be changed, the "stan-
dard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" by a redistricting plan must first
have federal authorization to commence the changes. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
91. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820. The Court found that "[t]he first of the two ma-
jority-black districts . . . [was] somewhat hook shaped. Centered in the northeast
portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then,
with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southern-most part of the State
near the South Carolina border." Id. Also, the Court concluded that "[tihe second
majority-black district . . . is even more unusually shaped." Id. The Court found that
the district "winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country, financial centers,
and manufacturing areas." Id. at 2821. In addition, the Court observed that
"[nlorthbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate
districts in one county, only to 'trade' districts when they enter the next county." Id.
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on its face, it could only be interpreted as an effort to segregate
voters into new voting districts because of their race. 2 The
Court, in a five to four decision, held that the appellants stated a
claim for which relief could be granted under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when they alleged that
the Assembly's redistricting plan was so irrational on its face
that it could be understood only as an effort to separate voters by
race without sufficient justification.93
More importantly, the Court affirmed the use of strict scrutiny
review when examining state race-based classifications by con-
cluding that if the appellants' allegation of racial gerrymandering
remained uncontradicted, the trial court should determine
"whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further
a compelling governmental interest." 4 Without question, Shaw
is an example of the conservative members of the Court achiev-
ing two goals in one case: affirming the use of strict scrutiny as
the standard of review for state race-based classifications and
expanding the use of strict scrutiny review into the realm of ra-
cial gerrymandering.
On remand, the district court held that the Assembly had
adequately established that the redistricting plan was "narrowly
92. Id. at 2832.
93. Id. In addition, the Court stated that: "Appellants contend legislation that
is so bizarre on its face . . . demands the same close scrutiny that we give other
state laws that classify citizens by race. Our voting rights precedents support that
conclusion." Id. at 2825. Thus, the Court in Shaw recognized that strict scrutiny
review extends not only to express racial classifications, but also to laws that are
neutral on their face but can only be explained by one medium-race.
94. Id. at 2832. Justice O'Connor, in supporting the majority opinion's use of
strict scrutiny, contended that: "[W]e have held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their
race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest." Id. at
2825. One author provides a compelling argument against the Court's decision in
Shaw to base its analysis on the civil rights decisions of the past:
The North Carolina Assembly decided that the United States Congressional
Representatives from North Carolina were not a true embodiment of the popu-
lation of the state, and in order to remedy that problem, it drew lines on the
basis of race to better enhance minority representation. The Court then
stepped in and, using the civil rights mantle of the past, decided that the use
of race in any instance cannot be beneficial. But it failed to even deliberate on
what Justice Stevens puts forth as ironic: that the development of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence involved minorities being denied power, and in
Shaw, the group that alleged that its voting power had been diminished was
a group of white voters using the civil rights decisions of the past to retain
majority power. It is suggestive of this author that although discrimination is
still prevalent in America, the courts are not the only branch fighting against
it.
Christopher J. Soller, Recent Decision, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 885, 895-96 (1994).
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tailored" to serve a "compelling governmental interest." 5 First,
the district court reasoned that the state had a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest" in taking action to comply with the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.96 Also, the district court concluded that be-
cause the plan neither created more majority-minority districts
than was reasonably necessary nor imposed a rigid quota for
minority representation, the plan was "narrowly tailored" to
serve the State of North Carolina's "compelling governmental
interests."97 Thus, Shaw represents at least one instance where
a governmental body overcame strict scrutiny review and its rigid
two-prong test.
The Court revisited the redistricting issue in Miller v. John-
son," in which the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether Georgia's newly created congressional district gave rise
to a valid equal protection claim under Shaw, and if so, whether
the district was "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest."99 The Court first reasoned that parties al-
leging that a state had created voting districts on the basis of
race were not required to make a threshold showing of "bizarre-
ness."' ° Instead, the Court reasoned that "parties may rely on
evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based
districting."" ' The Court concluded that the plaintiffs burden
in Miller was to show that race was the predominant reason
behind the legislature's decision to position a large number of
voters within or without a single district in order to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.0 2 After concluding that
race was the predominant and overriding factor in the state
legislature's redistricting plan, the Court held that Georgia's
95. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 475 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
96. Shaw, 861 F. Supp. at 444.
97. Id. at 454.
98. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
99. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482. Justice Kennedy authored the opinion of the
Court. The same five justices who were in the majority in Shaw were also in the
majority in Miller and Adarand: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
100. Id. at 2488. The Court then concluded that Miller "requires us further to
consider the requirements of the proof necessary to sustain this equal protection
challenge." Id.
101. Id. at 2486.
102. Id. at 2488. The Court explained that to meet this initial burden, the
plaintiff had two avenues of proof: either circumstantial evidence of a voting
district's shape or direct evidence of the legislature's purpose in drawing the district.
Id. In addition, the Court explained that "a plaintiff must prove that the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including ... compact-
ness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual
shared interests, to racial considerations." Id.
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redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.'03 The
Court found that satisfying the Justice Department's pre-clear-
ance demands of having three majority-minority districts was not
reasonably necessary and therefore was not a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest."' Lastly, the Court concluded that it
would be "inappropriate for a court engaged in constitutional
scrutiny to accord deference to the Justice Department's interpre-
tation of the [Voting Rights] Act." 5
Both Shaw and Miller are examples of the Court's return after
Metro Broadcasting to using strict scrutiny whenever the Court
is confronted with an equal protection challenge to a governmen-
tal racial classification. Thus, it is now necessary to return to the
decision in Adarand to examine the Court's strong justifications
for analyzing the case under strict scrutiny and "color-blind"
constitutional reviews.
SECTION III: REVERSE INCORPORATION PREVAILS
In analyzing the Court's decision in Adarand, three general
propositions are apparent. First, it is necessary to discuss the
Court's justifications for invalidating the intermediate scrutiny
standard of Metro Broadcasting and returning to strict scrutiny
in Adarand. Second, it is necessary to examine Justice
O'Connor's three-step rationale of "skepticism," "consistency" and
"congruence" as the hallmark of the Court's history regarding
classifications based on race. Third, the Court's adoption of strict
scrutiny review for federal racial classifications completes a "full
circle" of equal protection analysis that started with discrimina-
tion against minorities, particularly African-Americans, and con-
cluded with the Court's preference for upholding equal protection
challenges brought by those in the majority.
103. Id. at 2491. The Court reasoned that "the District Court applied the cor-
rect analysis, and its finding that race was the predominant factor motivated the
drawing of the [district]." Id. at 2488. Additionally, the Court reasoned that the
district court's finding "that the drawing of narrow land bridges to incorporate with-
in the District outlying appendages containing nearly 80% of the district's total black
population was a deliberate attempt to bring black populations into the district." Id.
at 2489.
104. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491. After several redistricting plans had been re-
jected by the Attorney General of the United States, the state legislature of Georgia
followed the Attorney General's recommendation of not two, but three majority-mi-
nority districts. Id. at 2484.
105. Id. at 2491.
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A. Intermediate Scrutiny Yields to Strict Scrutiny
To reiterate, the Court in Adarand held that all racial classifi-
cations, including classifications imposed by the federal govern-
ment, must be "narrowly tailored" classifications that advance
"compelling governmental interests.""' The initial impact of
this holding is that the standard of review for federal racial clas-
sifications has gone from intermediate scrutiny to strict scruti-
ny."7 In terms of uniformity and logic, the Court's holding
should come as no surprise. First, state and local governmental
racial classifications were already subject to strict scrutiny. Sec-
ond, the four dissenters in Metro Broadcasting'°. who wanted
strict scrutiny to apply to federal racial classifications were
joined on the Court in 1991 by Justice Clarence Thomas, who
historically has been referred to as "conservative." Thus, in prac-
tical terms, a court's standard of review must now focus on
whether a program containing a racial classification is "narrowly
tailored" and serves a "compelling governmental interest" rather
than Whether the program's use of race is "substantially related"
to furthering an "important governmental objective." While the
standards of strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are not
much different in terms of language and phrases, the use of the
strict scrutiny standard may create an insurmountable barrier.
The Adarand holding sends a definite signal to lower courts:
declare any and all racial classifications unconstitutional unless
there is an overwhelming reason for having the classification. In
addition, the concurrences of Justices Scalia and Thomas in
Adarand encourage lower federal courts to strike down any clas-
sifications based on race. The two concurrences also explicitly
state what Chief Justice Rehnquist could not because the Chief
Justice wanted to garner the votes of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy. In the end, Adarand reflects the Chief Justice's long-
held belief in limiting the scope and power of the federal govern-
ment. 09
106. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
107. See id. at 2113. The Court's holding in Adarand expressly overruled Metro
Broadcasting in which the Court held that "benign" federal racial classifications are
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id. The classifications must serve "important gov-
ernmental objectives" and be "substantially related" to those objectives. See Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567-69 (1990), overruled by Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
108. The four dissenters in Metro Broadcasting were: Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 597.
109. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress' constitutional Commerce
Clause authority because possession of a gun is not an economic activity that sub-
1996
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For example, Justice Scalia concluded that "[in my view, gov-
ernment can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating
on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimi-
nation in the opposite direction." "0 Thus, the message Justice
Scalia's concurrence sends to lower federal courts is that no inter-
est is compelling enough to justify any racial classification. In
addition, Justice Thomas contended that "government-sponsored
racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious
as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice.""' Therefore,
the conservative members of the Court are sending a clear mes-
sage to lower courts who will have to examine racial classifica-
tions in the future. The message is that all uses of racial classifi-
cations are unconstitutional and outside the principles of equal
protection.
B. "Skepticism," "Consistency" and "Congruence"
Justice O'Connor asserted in the majority opinion of Adarand
that three propositions have been developed by the Court regard-
ing racial classifications: "skepticism," "consistency" and "congru-
ence.""2 First, Justice O'Connor's observation of "skepticism"
was a correct assertion of the Court's concern over racial classifi-
cations. From a historical perspective, the Court has applied its
most stringent judicial review-strict scrutiny-for most of the
twentieth century to racial classifications. Second, Justice
O'Connor's contention of "consistency" with racial classifications
appears on the surface to be well-founded because the Court's
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause does not
depend on the individual race of those benefitted or burdened by
stantially affects interstate commerce).
110. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring). In addition, Justice
Scalia stated that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimi-
nation should be made whole; but .under our Constitution there can be no such
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race." Id.
111. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Thomas asserted
several bases for eliminating racial classifications:
As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a
government's racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a
race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disad-
vantaged . . . . Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority,
or . . . provoke resentment among those who believe they have been wronged
by the government's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt
an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences.
112. Id. at 2111.
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a racial classification."' Third, Justice O'Connor's assertion of
"congruence," or equal review of equal protection claims under
either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, appears worthy as
well. However, the propositions of "consistency" and "congruence"
deserve some additional analysis before deferring to Justice
O'Connor's assertions regarding the history of the Court and its
dealings with racial classifications.
At first glance, "consistency" appears to be the right word to
characterize racial classifications. However, as Justice Stevens
observed in his dissenting opinion, the consistency approach can
hardly be said to be part of the Court's overall review of "sepa-
rate categories for discrimination against different classes of
individuals."" For example, as Justice Stevens contended,
when confronted with gender discrimination the Court will not
only apply intermediate scrutiny but will now apply strict scruti-
ny if there is racial discrimination." 5 Perhaps the legal issue
now is whether racial classifications are more harmful than gen-
der-based classifications. Because the Court will universally ap-
ply strict scrutiny to racial classifications and intermediate scru-
tiny to gender classifications, the Court may have already given
an answer. If the Court aspires to create standards of review for
different classifications, one standard of review should be univer-
sally applied whether the classification involves race, gender, na-
tional origin or any other immutable trait.
At the same time, Justice Stevens made the striking observa-
tion that if Craig and Adarand remain the law, governmental
bodies will be able to enact affirmative action programs for wom-
en more easily than for minorities." 6 As Justice Stevens con-
cluded, the irony is that the Equal Protection Clause, which was
intended to end discrimination against African-Americans, will
113. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
114. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens.
115. Id. In 1976, the Court held that gender-based classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court con-
cluded that the classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' Craig, 429
U.S. at 197. In Craig, an Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating"
beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18. Id. at 192. It is
of interest to note that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was in the majority in
Adarand, dissented in Craig and concluded that: "I think the Oklahoma statute
challenged here need pass only the 'rational basis' equal protection analysis ... and
I believe that it is constitutional under that analysis." Id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Obviously, Chief Justice Rehnquist based his dissent on the notion that
classifications based on gender do not infringe upon the protection of any protected
class and thus do not deserve the protection of any form of heightened scrutiny.
116. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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be a greater obstacle for future courts to remedy racial discrimi-
nation." '7 Thus, the Court's idea of "equal protection" really on-
ly guarantees in the future that certain types of classifications or
discrimination will be treated with different standards of review
even though the discrimination is essentially the same in that an
individual is classified by an immutable characteristic such as
the color of their skin, their age or gender. "Consistency," as
Justice O'Connor mentioned, exists on the micro level of racial
classifications and not on the macro level of all classifications
that treat individuals differently because of an immutable trait of
their person. In any event, perhaps the only consistency Justice
O'Connor was referring to was for racial classifications and at a
minimum, the Court did achieve a consistent yet rigid and strin-
gent review for all racial classifications.
C. "Congruence:" Reverse Incorporation Prevails
Justice O'Connor referred to "congruence" as the last general
proposition regarding the Court's history in dealing with racial
classifications."' Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the Court's
equal protection examination under both the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments is the same has come to be known as "re-
verse incorporation."' In defending "reverse incorporation" and
her observations of the Court's tendencies with regard to race,
Justice O'Connor logically concluded that "any person, of whatev-
er race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification sub-
jecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judi-
cial scrutiny."2'
This statement by Justice O'Connor is at the heart of the issue
of racial classifications. Justice O'Connor is correct that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments both demand the same equal pro-
tection analysis. Moreover, by actually changing the law to make
it uniform, the Adarand Court has succeeded in stating a logical
proposition and carrying out that proposition. However, one sim-
117. Id. In addition, Justice Stevens prudently observed that, "[w]hen a court
becomes preoccupied with abstract standards, it risks sacrificing common sense at
the alter of formal consistency." Id.
118. Id. at 2111.
119. See Bradford Russell Clark, Judicial Review of Congressional Section Five
Action: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969 (1984). For
example, "'[rieverse incorporation,' as the doctrine is sometimes called, purports to
subject federal and state action to identical levels of equal protection scrutiny and
therefore would treat Congress and states as possessing coterminous authority to
enact laws implicating equal protection concerns." Id.
120. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111.
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ple fact remains: prejudice and discrimination are prevalent in
American society today. While there should be no "creditor" or
"debtor" race, the Court should attempt to strike a balance be-
tween universally disallowing rigid quotas and upholding pro-
grams that meet the Court's language of being "narrowly tai-
lored" to serve a "compelling governmental interest."
It is the Court's use of broad and undefined language that
helps it avoid giving a meaningful and interpretative examina-
tion of laws that classify individuals differently. One could easily
ask why gender-based classifications are afforded intermediate
scrutiny review while race-based classifications are afforded strict
scrutiny review. 2 Without question, gender-based discrimina-
tion can be as harmful as race discrimination. However, in the
Court's view, uniformity only means one standard of review for a
particular classification, not one standard for all classifications
that are based on an immutable trait of an individual.
D. Overruling Metro Broadcasting and Closing the Window on
Affirmative Action Through the Use of a "Color-Blind"
Constitution
In overruling Metro Broadcasting, the Court in Adarand was
able to use the principle of "reverse incorporation" to sidestep the
issue of stare decisis.22 The Court in Adarand concluded that
its use of intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting differed
from prior decisions by failing to recognize the difficulty of decid-
ing whether a classification is "benign" and also for failing to
understand the "congruence" between federal and state racial
classification treatment.'23 Thus, the Court in Adarand correct-
121. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that gender classifi-
cations are subject to intermediate scrutiny review) with Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that federal, state, and local racial classifi-
cations are subject to strict scrutiny). For example, one legal scholar has concluded
that: "[T]he Supreme Court has decided affirmative action cases on . . . facts and
circumstances reflected in the relevant records and has refused to articulate a con-
trolling test for all types of affirmative action plans whether voluntary, part of a
consent decree . . . a contempt order or a remedy ordered by the court." Maureen E.
Lally-Green, Affirmative Action: Are the Equal Protection and Title VII Tests Synony-
mous?, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 295, 297 (1988) (emphasis added).
122. Stare decisis refers to a "[plolicy of courts to stand by precedent and not
to disturb settled point." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). In addition,
the doctrine of stare decisis is recognized "when [a] court has once laid down a prin-
ciple of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle,
and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless
of whether the parties and property are the same." Id.
123. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112. Justice O'Connor cited the plurality opinion
in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), which gives the follow-
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ly concluded that the highest judicial scrutiny has been used by
the Court when examining racial classifications. However, the
Court, in its disregard for stare decisis may be relying on cases in
which minorities used the Equal Protection Clause to overcome
racial classifications. Nonetheless, the Court's decision in
Adarand to overrule a case that was decided only five years ago,
balanced against the conservative majority of the Court leads to
one conclusion. Although the five members of the majority of the
Court may have had a logical answer to the issue resolved in
Adarand, they may find that their general equal protection anal-
ysis will be interpreted far differently in Romer v. Evans."2
The notion that the Constitution is "color-blind" is certainly an
accurate and noteworthy observation of the current Court's view
of the Constitution. However, throughout the Court's history,
decisions involving race have often been based on the color of
one's skin in the realm of equal protection jurisprudence. For
example, perhaps Adarand should be mentioned as the final
event in Justice Marshall's outstanding chronology of race and
the Constitution in Bakke:
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Government
ing support to the use of strict scrutiny when racial classifications are involved:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based mea-
sures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign"
or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate no-
tions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legis-
lative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.
Id. at 2112 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
124. 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (granting certiorari). Generally, Romer involves the
State of Colorado's voter-initiated Constitutional Amendment II which provides in
relevant part that "neither the State of Colorado . . . nor any of its agencies . . .
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation . . . shall constitute . . . any person . . . or class of persons . . . to have
or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation." COLO. CONST. amend. II (permanently enjoined by Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995)).
In the latest disposition of the case, the Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting
en banc, concluded first that Amendment II triggers strict scrutiny review. Romer,
882 P.2d at 1341. The court affirmed "the trial court's entry of a permanent
injunction enjoining . . . enforc[ement] . . . [of the] voter initiated amendment to the
Colorado Constitution . . . ." Id. at 1338. Lastly, the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that the amendment was not "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling govern-
mental interest." Id. at 1350.
The relevance of Romer is the possibility that the Court may decide the
issue of whether homosexuals and lesbians constitute a "protected" or "suspect" class
and thus are afforded the protection of strict scrutiny review.
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started several "affirmative action" programs. This court in the Civil
Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward
complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this
nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had Brown
v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of Congress, followed by
numerous affirmative-action programs. Now, we have this Court again
stepping in this time to stop affirmative-action programs of the type used
by the University of California. 2 '
The Adarand Court concluded that federal racial classifications
must meet an overwhelming burden-strict scrutiny.
The "full circle" that Justice Marshall described in Bakke be-
gins with the Court's reluctance to recognize the equality of all
races in cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy. The next quarter of
the circle covers the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
which includes both an Equal Protection Clause and a Due Pro-
cess Clause that applies to all state-based legislation. The third
quarter of the circle is the Court's rejection of Plessy's "separate
but equal" principle and the creation of affirmative action pro-
grams to help disadvantaged minorities overcome past and pres-
ent discrimination and prejudice.
However, the final quarter of the circle is the most interesting.
Beginning with Bakke, as Justice Marshall explained, the Court
intervened on behalf of Caucasians within the majority of Ameni-
can society. The circle was completed with the Court's decision in
Adarand to universally apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifi-
cations. Thus, while the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were
once used by minorities to gain equality, courts now focus on
"equal playing fields" in allowing Caucasians to challenge legisla-
tion that creates preferences for minorities. The problem with
this approach is best summarized as follows: "This shift from the
use of strict scrutiny to review governmental oppression of Blacks
to review of any use of race has never been explicitly addressed
by the Court; the underlying justification for the change remains
undiscussed." 26 However, the Court's shift in its application of
strict scrutiny is based on the fatal premise that American soci-
ety is "color-blind."
125. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J.) (separate opinion) (first emphasis
added).
126. Gotanda, supra note 27, at 48. In addition, Gotanda concludes that:
Under the Brown interpretation of strict scrutiny, heightened judicial review
should be applied to all restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a racial
group. In the context of racial subordination of Blacks, the implied rationale
for such heightened review has been the past and continuing racial subordina-
tion of the group as a whole.
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With the amount of discrimination and prejudice still prevalent
as the end of the twentieth century approaches, the Court's hold-
ing in Adarand is a perfect example of the highly conservative
and reactionary mindset a majority of the Court has when re-
viewing affirmative action programs. Perhaps the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution as being "color-blind" is correct.
Also, it is possible that the Framers of the Constitution never
envisioned a culturally diverse nation. Regardless, the channels
of achieving equality appear to be lessening despite the fact that
all races are not on equal footing even today.
CONCLUSION
The logic of holding that federal racial classifications based on
race are subject to strict scrutiny review provides a uniform and
universal standard of review for examining any racial classifica-
tions. However, the Court's drive to achieve uniformity in review-
ing racial classifications may be only a narrow view of society in
the United States in the late twentieth century. By elevating the
standard of review for racial classifications created by the federal
government, the Court attempted to affirm the principle that the
Constitution is "color-blind.""7 However, the prevalent discrimi-
nation and prejudice that remains in our society was completely
omitted from the Court's analysis that revolved around "compel-
ling governmental interests" and programs that are "narrowly
tailored." Nonetheless, a positive outcome is certain from the
holding of Adarand: "equal protection" is alive and well within
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
problem not addressed in Adarand is that the Court's view of
equal protection, whether under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments, does not recognize the necessity of reasonable affirmative
action programs that ironically should be per se "compelling
governmental interests." The advancement of racial diversity in
our multicultural society transcends the harm to Caucasian-
owned subcontractors who were disadvantaged by the preferences
that were given to DBE's in Adarand. The Court, by selecting
strict scrutiny in Adarand, continued down a path that is begin-
ning to lead further and further away from racial equality in
America. Hopefully, the conservative influence of the Court has
reached its peak. If not, the end of all affirmative action pro-
grams may occur in the near future.
Terrence M. Lewis
127. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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